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Abstract
We introduce Q-Nash, a quantum annealing algo-
rithm for the NP-complete problem of finding pure
Nash equilibria in graphical games. The algo-
rithm consists of two phases. The first phase de-
termines all combinations of best response strate-
gies for each player using classical computation.
The second phase finds pure Nash equilibria using
a quantum annealing device by mapping the com-
puted combinations to a quadratic unconstrained
binary optimization formulation based on the Set
Cover problem. We empirically evaluate Q-Nash
on D-Wave’s Quantum Annealer 2000Q using dif-
ferent graphical game topologies. The results with
respect to solution quality and computing time are
compared to a Brute Force algorithm and a Random
Search heuristic.
1 Introduction
Applications of conventional game theory have played an
important role in many modern strategic decision making
processes including diplomacy, economics, national security,
and business [Carfı` et al., 2011; Rabin, 1993; Roy et al.,
2010]. Game theory is a mathematical paradigm in which
such domain-specific decision situations are modeled [Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1991]. Multiple players interact with each
other to collectively complete a task or to enforce their inter-
ests. In the classical model of game theory [Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944] all players choose an action simulta-
neously and obtain a certain payoff (utility), which depends
on the actions of the other players. The most common solu-
tion concept for such a decision problem is called Nash equi-
librium (NE) [Nash, 1951], in which no player is able to uni-
laterally improve his payoff by changing his chosen action.
There exist many different representations for such simul-
taneous games. The most popular is the strategic or standard
normal-form game representation, which is often used for 2-
player games, like the prisoner dilemma or battle of the sexes.
However, due to its exponential growth of the representa-
tional size w.r.t the number of players [Kearns et al., 2013],
a more compact version, called graphical game, is increas-
ingly used to model multi-player scenarios [La Mura, 2000;
Koller and Milch, 2003; Littman et al., 2002; Palmieri and
Lallouet, 2017]. Here a player’s action only depends on a
certain number of other players’ actions (a so called player’s
neighborhood). These neighborhoods are visualized by an
underlying graph with players as vertices and the dependen-
cies as edges.
While pure strategies, where each player unambiguously
decides on a particular action, are conceptually simpler than
mixed strategies, the associated computational problems ap-
pear to be harder [Gottlob et al., 2005]. This also applies
to the compact representation of graphical games, for which
the complexity of finding pure strategy Nash equilibria (PNE-
GG) was proven to be NP-complete, even in the restricted
case of neighborhoods of maximum size 3 with at most 3 ac-
tions per player [Gottlob et al., 2005].
Although there are many algorithms that find mixed or
approximated NE in graphical games [Kearns et al., 2013;
Ortiz and Kearns, 2003; Bhat and Leyton-Brown, 2004;
Soni et al., 2007], there are only a couple of algorithms that
deal with pure Nash equilibria (PNE). In this paper, we fo-
cus on finding the hard computational Nash equilibria in the
case of pure strategies, where each player chooses to play an
action in a deterministic, non-random manner.
With D-Wave Systems releasing the first commercially
available quantum annealer in 20111, there is now the pos-
sibility to find solutions for such complex problems in a com-
pletely different way compared to classical computation. To
use D-Wave’s quantum annealer, the problem has to be for-
mulated as a quadratic unconstrained binary optimization
(QUBO) problem [Boros et al., 2007], which is one possi-
ble input type for the annealer. In doing so, the metaheuristic
quantum annealing seeks to find the minimum of an objective
function, i.e., the best solution of the defined configuration
space [McGeoch, 2014].
In this paper, we propose the first quantum annealing al-
gorithm for finding PNE-GG, called Q-Nash. The algorithm
consists of two phases. The first phase determines all com-
binations of best response strategies for each player using
classical computation. The second phase finds pure Nash
Equilibria using a quantum annealing device by mapping the
computed combinations to a QUBO formulation based on the
Set Cover problem. We empirically evaluate Q-Nash on D-
1https://www.dwavesys.com/news/d-wave-systems-sells-its-
first-quantum-computing-system-lockheed-martin-corporation
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Wave’s Quantum Annealer 2000Q using different graphical
game topologies. The results with respect to solution quality
and computing time are compared to a Brute Force algorithm
and a Random Search heuristic.
2 Background
2.1 Graphical Games and Pure Nash Equilibria
In an n-player game, each player p (1 ≤ p ≤ n), has a fi-
nite set of strategies or actions, Sp, with |Sp| ≥ 2. Such a
game can be visualized by a set of n matrices Mp. The en-
try Mp(s1, ..., sn) = Mp(s) specifies the payoff to player p
when the joint action (also, strategy profile) of the n players
is s ∈ S, with S = ∏ni=1 Si being the set of combined strat-
egy profiles. In order to specify a game with n players and s
strategies each, the representational size is nsn, an amount of
information exponential with respect to the number of play-
ers. However, players often interact only with a limited num-
ber of other players, which allows for a much more succinct
representation. In [Kearns et al., 2013] such a compact rep-
resentation, called graphical game, is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. (Graphical Game)
An n-player graphical game is a pair (G,M), where G is
an undirected graph with n vertices and M is a set of n ma-
trices Mp with 1 ≤ p ≤ n, called the local game matrices.
Player p is represented by a vertex labeled p in G. We use
NG(p) ⊆ {1, ..., n} to denote the set of neighbors of player
p in G – i.e., those vertices q such that the undirected edge
(p, q) appears in G. By convention, NG(p) always includes
p himself. The interpretation is that each player is in a game
with only his neighbors in G. Thus, the size of the graphical
game representation is only exponential in the maximal node
degree d of the graph, nsd. If |NG(p)| = k and s ∈
∏k
i=1 Si,
Mp(s) denotes the payoff to p when his k neighbors (includ-
ing himself) play s.
Consider a game with n players and strategy sets
S1, ..., Sn. For every strategy profile s ∈ S, the strategy of
player p is denoted by sp and s−p corresponds to the (n−1)-
tuple of strategies of all players but p. For every s
′
p ∈ Sp
and s−p ∈ S−p we denote by (s−p; s′p) the strategy profile
in which player p plays s
′
p and all the other players play ac-
cording to s−p. One has to mention that a strategy profile s
is called global, if all n players contribute to it, i.e., a global
combined strategy s consists of every player playing one of
his actions [Gottlob et al., 2005].
Definition 2.2. (Pure Nash Equilibrium)
A global strategy profile s is a PNE, if for every player p
and strategy s
′
p ∈ Sp we have Mp(s) ≥ Mp(s−p; s
′
p). That
is, no player can improve his expected payoff by deviating
unilaterally from a Nash equilibrium.
[Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2006] define a best re-
sponse strategy as follows:
Definition 2.3. (Best Response Strategy)
A best response strategy of player p is defined by:
BRMp(s−p) , {sp | sp ∈ Sp and ∀s
′
p ∈ Sp :Mp(s−p; sp)
≥Mp(s−p; s′p)}
Intuitively, BRMp(s−p) is the set of strategies in Sp that
maximize p’s payoff if the other players play according to
s−p. Thus, a strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium if
for every player p, sp ∈ BRMp(s−p).
2.2 Quantum Annealing
Quantum annealing is a metaheuristic for solving complex
optimization and decision problems [Kadowaki and Nishi-
mori, 1998]. D-Wave’s quantum annealing heuristic is imple-
mented in hardware, designed to find the lowest energy state
of a spin glass system, described by an Ising Hamiltonian,
H(s) =
∑
i
hixi +
∑
i<j
Jijxixj (1)
where hi is the on-site energy of qubit i, Jij are the interac-
tion energies of two qubits i and j, and xi represents the spin
(−1,+1) of the ith qubit. The basic process of quantum an-
nealing is to physically interpolate between an initial Hamil-
tonian HI with an easy to prepare minimal energy configura-
tion (or ground state), and a problem HamiltonianHP , whose
minimal energy configuration is sought that corresponds to
the best solution of the defined problem (see Eq. 2). This
transition is described by an adiabatic evolution path which
is mathematically represented as function s(t) and decreases
from 1 to 0 [McGeoch, 2014].
H(t) = s(t)HI + (1− s(t))HP (2)
If this transition is executed sufficiently slow, the probability
to find the ground state of the problem Hamiltonian is close to
1 [Albash and Lidar, 2018]. Thus, by mapping the Nash equi-
librium decision problem onto a spin glass system, quantum
annealing is able to find the solution of it.
For completeness, we map our NE descision problem to an
alternative formulation of the Ising spin glass system. The so
called QUBO problem [Boros et al., 2007] is mathematically
equivalent and uses 0 and 1 for the spin variables [Su et al.,
2016]. The quantum annealer is as well designed to minimize
the functional form of the QUBO:
minxtQx with x ∈ {0, 1}n (3)
with x being a vector of binary variables of size n, and Q be-
ing an n×n real-valued matrix describing the relationship be-
tween the variables. Given the matrixQ : n×n, the annealing
process tries to find binary variable assignments x ∈ {0, 1}n
to minimize the objective function in Eq. 3.
2.3 Set Cover Problem
Since the QUBO formulation of Q-Nash resembles the well
known Set Cover (SC) problem, it is introduced here. Within
the SC problem, one has to find the smallest possible number
of subsets from a given collection of subsets Vk ⊆ U with
1 ≤ k ≤ N , such that the union of them is equal to a global
superset U of size n. This problem was proven to be NP-hard
[Karp, 1972]. In [Lucas, 2014] the QUBO formulation for
the Set Cover problem is given by:
H = A
n∑
α=1
(
1−
N∑
m=1
xα,m
)2
+A
n∑
α=1
(
N∑
m=1
mxα,m −
∑
k:α∈Vk
xk
)2
(4)
with xk being a binary variable which is 1, if set k is in-
cluded within the chosen sets, and 0 otherwise. xα,m denotes
a binary variable which is 1 if the number of chosen subsets
Vk which include element α is m ≥ 1, and 0 otherwise. The
first energy term imposes the constraints that for any given α
exactly one xα,m must be 1, since each element of U must
be included a fixed number of times, and that the number of
times that we claimed α was included is in fact equal to the
number of subsets Vk we have included with α as an element.
A is a penalty value, which is added on top of the solution
energy, described by H , if a constraint was not satisfied, i.e.
one of the two terms (quadratic differences) are unequal to 0.
Therefore adding a penalty value states a solution as invalid.
Additionally, the SC problem minimizes over the number of
chosen subsets Vk. We skip discussing the term due to the fact
that it has no impact on our Q-Nash QUBO problem later on.
3 Related Work
Most known algorithms focus on finding mixed or approx-
imated NE [Kearns et al., 2013; Ortiz and Kearns, 2003;
Bhat and Leyton-Brown, 2004; Soni et al., 2007]. However,
some investigations in determining PNE in graphical and sim-
ilar variations of games were made.
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou present a reduction from
graphical games to Markov random fields such that PNE can
be found by statistical inference. They use known statistical
inference algorithms like belief propagation, junction tree al-
gorithm and Markov Chain Monte Carlo to determine PNE in
graphical games [Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2006].
In [Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2007], the authors analyze the
problem of computing pure Nash equilibria in action graph
games (AGGs), another compact game theoretic representa-
tion, which is similar to graphical games. They propose a
dynamic-programming approach that constructs equilibria of
the game from equilibria of restricted games played on sub-
graphs of the action graph. In particular, under the premise
that the game is symmetric and the action graph has bounded
treewidth, their algorithm determines the existence of a PNE
in polynomial time.
Palmieri and Lallouet deal with constraint games, for
which constraint programming is used to express players
preferences. They rethink their solving technique in terms
of constraint propagation by considering players preferences
as global constraints. Their approach is able to find all pure
Nash equilibria for some problems with 200 players and also
shows that performance can be improved for graphical games
[Palmieri and Lallouet, 2017].
With quantum computing gaining more and more atten-
tion2 and none of the related work making use of quantum
annealing in order to find PNE, we propose a solution ap-
proach using a quantum annealer.
4 Q-Nash
In the following sections we present the concept of Q-Nash.
Q-Nash consists of two phases, which are described below.
2https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/the-cios-guide-to-
quantum-computing/
4.1 Determining best response strategies
In the first phase, we identify each player’s best response to
what the other players might do. That is, for every strat-
egy profile s, we search player p‘s strategy (or strategies)
with the maximum payoff Mp(s). This involves iterating
through each player in turn and determining their optimal
strategies. An example is given in 4.1. This can be feasibly
done in polynomial time, since one can easily explore each
player’s matrixMp representing the utility function, i.e., pay-
offs [Gottlob et al., 2005]. Therefore the first part, which
we see as preliminary step for our Q-Nash algorithm, is ex-
ecuted on a classical computer. After doing this, one gets a
set of combined strategies with each being a best response
to the other players’ played strategies. This set is denoted
by B = {BRMp | (1 ≤ p ≤ n)} and has the cardinality
CB =
∑n
p=1 |BRMp |.
Example 4.1. In Tab. 1 the local payoff matrix M of player
A is visualized. For instance, assume player B plays action
2 and player C chooses action 1. In this case, a best re-
sponse strategy for player A is action 0, due to the fact, that
he gets the most payoff in this situation, i.e. 4. This leads to
a best response strategy combination for player A, denoted
by a pointed set {A0, B2, C1} with player A being the base
point of it.
A B0 C0 B0 C1 B1 C0 B1 C1 B2 C0 B2 C1
0 4 1 2 2 1 4
1 1 3 2 1 2 2
Table 1: Local dependency payoff matrix M of player A. The pay-
offs marked in bold correspond to a best response strategy of player
A.
4.2 Finding PNE using quantum annealing
In the second phase, a PNE is identified, when all players are
playing one of their best response strategies simultaneously.
With the computed set B of the classical phase, the following
question arises:
“Is there a union of the combined best response strategies of
B which results in a global strategy profile, under the premise
that every player plays one of his best response actions?” —
As stated in Definition 2.3 this would lead to a PNE.
This question resembles the Set Cover (SC) problem,
stated in Sec. 2.3. It asks for the smallest possible number
of subsets to cover the elements of a given global set (in
our case, this global set would be a feasible global strategy
profile and the subsets correspond to our best response
strategy profiles of B). However, for our purposes we have
to modify the given formulation in Eq. 4 as follows:
H = A
n∑
p=1
1− |Sp|∑
j=1
CB∑
m=1
xp,j,m
2 +A n∑
p=1
|Sp|∑
j=1
 CB∑
m=1
mxp,j,m −
∑
k:p,j∈sk
xk
2
+A
(
n−
CB∑
k=1
xk
)2
(5)
Eq. 5 is quite similar to Eq. 4. However, an element α
of the superset of Eq. 4 corresponds to a player p and his
chosen action j of our global strategy profile. Nevertheless,
the intention of those first two energy terms complies with the
intention of Eq. 4, stated in Sec. 2.3. Further, another energy
term must be added to our QUBO problem as constraint. This
last energy term, for which an instance is given in Example
4.2, states that exactly n sets of B should be included to form
the global strategy profile. This constraint implicitly ensures
that every player is playing one of his best response strategies.
A is called penalty value, which is added on top of the
solution energy, if a constraint was not satisfied, i.e. one of
the three terms (quadratic differences) are unequal to 0. Thus,
adding a penalty value states a solution as invalid. Only if the
total energy described by H = 0 the corresponding solution
is a valid global best response strategy profile and thus a PNE.
All these energy terms are specified within the QUBO
problem matrix Q, which the quantum annealer takes as an
input, goes through the annealing process and responds with
a binary vector x as a solution, see Sec. 2.2. This vector in-
dicates which best response strategy of each player should be
chosen to form a PNE.
Example 4.2. To demonstrate the function of the last energy
term (constraint) of Eq. 5, an excerpt of best response strat-
egy combinations of B (in form of pointed sets, with the bold
player-action-combination being the base point) for an ar-
bitrary 4-player game are visualized in Fig. 1. The green
union of four best response sets leads to a PNE, in which
every player is playing one of his best response strategies.
Although the red union of three sets also leads to a global
combined strategy set, in which every player is playing one
of his actions, it is not a PNE, due to player B not playing a
best response strategy.
A1
B1C1
A1
B1C1
B1
D0A1
D0
D0
C1
D0
C1B0
A1
B0C1
…
…
…
1
2
A1 B1 C1 D0
A1 B0 C1 D0
1
2
⋃
= Nash Equilibrium
≠ Nash Equilibrium
Figure 1: On the left hand an excerpt of superset B is given. On
the right hand the sets are united, with each (1&2) being a global
strategy combination, but only one (1) being a PNE.
5 Experiments
5.1 Evaluation Graph-Topologies
For evaluating Q-Nash, we implemented a game generator.
It creates graphical game instances of three different pop-
ular graphical structures, which were often used in litera-
ture [Koller and Milch, 2003; Vickrey and Koller, 2002;
Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2007; Palmieri and Lallouet, 2017].
These graphical structures are shown in Fig. 2. As an input
a) Tree b) Circle c) Road
Figure 2: Different graphical game structures (topologies) which
indicate the dependencies between players of a game. (a) Tree-
Topology with n = 10, (b) Circle-Topology with n = 6 and
(c) Road-Topology with n = 6.
for our game generator, one can choose the number of play-
ers, the graph-topology and thus the dependencies between
the players and the number of actions for each player individ-
ually. The corresponding payoffs are sampled randomly from
[0, 15]. For our experiments we considered games with three
actions per player. The classic theorem of Nash [Nash, 1951]
states that for any game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in
the space of joint mixed strategies. However, in this work
we only consider pure strategies and therefore there might be
(graphical) games without any PNE (see, for instance, [Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994]). Additionally we want to em-
phasize, that Q-Nash is able to work on every graphical game
structure, even if the dependency graph is not connected, for
instance a set of trees (called forest).
5.2 Methods
QBSolv
Due to the fact, that quantum computing is still in its in-
fancy, and corresponding hardware is limited in the number of
qubits and their connectivity, we need to fall back to a hybrid
method (QBSolv3), in order to solve large problem instances.
QBSolv is a software that automatically splits instances up
into subproblems submitted to D-Wave’s quantum annealer,
and an extensive tabu search is applied to post-process all D-
Wave solutions. Additionally, QBSolv embeds the QUBO
problem to the quantum annealing hardware chip. QBSolv
further allows to specify certain parameters such as the num-
ber of individual solution attempts (num repeats), the sub-
problem size used to split up instances which do not fit com-
pletely onto the D-Wave hardware and many more. For de-
tailed information, see [Booth et al., 2017].
Brute Force
For evaluating the effectiveness of Q-Nash we implemented
a Brute Force (BF) algorithm to compare with. It determines
the best response strategy sets of all players in the same way
as Q-Nash does and afterwards tries out every possible com-
bination of those sets to form a valid global strategy set which
corresponds to a PNE. The number of combinations is expo-
nential with respect to the number of players of the game,∏n
p=1BRMp .
Random Search
Additionally, a Random Search (RS) algorithm was imple-
mented, which acts like the BF algorithm, but tries to ran-
3https://github.com/dwavesystems/qbsolv
domly find combinations of best response sets, which corre-
spond to a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore it takes a timespan
as an input parameter and terminates after a timeout occured.
5.3 Computational times of Q-Nash
With respect to the computational results stated in Tab. 2 we
first introduce the time components of Q-Nash’s total compu-
tation time. For a better understanding a general overview of
Q-Nash is given in Algorithm 1.
The find embedding time (3) states the time D-Wave’s clas-
sical embedding heuristic takes to find a valid subproblem
hardware embedding. Determining best responses (4) de-
scribes the time Q-Nash classical computing phase takes to
identify the best response strategies of every player and addi-
tionally build up the QUBO matrix. The QBSolv time can be
divided into the classical time (5) and the quantum annealing
time (6). The classical QBSolv time (5) comprises of not only
a tabu search, which iteratively processes all subproblem so-
lutions, it also contains the latency and job queuing time to
D-Wave’s quantum hardware. The quantum annealing time
(6) comprises of the number of subproblems times D-Wave’s
qpu-access-time.
Algorithm 1 General structure of Q-Nash
Input: Game instance as file
Parameter: List of QBSolv parameters (num repeats, subprob-
lem size,...)
Methods:
1. embedding = find hardware embedding for
subproblem size(subproblem size) (3)
2. Q = determine best response strategies
and build qubo matrix() (4)
3. binary vector = run QBSolv(Q, embedding,
num repeats, ...) (5)(6)
Output: All found PNE
6 Results & Discussion
We investigated the solution quality and computational time
of Q-Nash. Fig. 3 shows the ability of finding PNE of the
three proposed methods (Q-Nash with QBSolv, BF and RS)
in differently structured graphical games. For every graph
topology (Tree, Circle and Road) we used games with players
ranging from 6 to 10, due to the fact that BF took too long
to solve larger games. The results show that Q-Nash found
the same amount of PNE as the exact BF algorithm for those
instances. We ran RS as long as Q-Nash (total time) took to
solve the instances. One can see that RS was only able to find
one or two PNE in the smallest game instances with 6 players.
Because of Q-Nash performing well on these instances we
tested it for larger game instances, see Fig. 4 and 5. For
the Road- and Circle-Topology, the solution quality of Q-
Nash was evaluated with different numbers of players rang-
ing from 20 to 40. Running Q-Nash 20 times on every in-
stance, one can see that Q-Nash was not always able to find
the same amount of PNE per run. Although it seems that for
larger scaled game instances the variance of finding PNE de-
creases, one has to take into account that these game instances
Figure 3: Solution quality of Q-Nash, BF and RS on various game
instances.
might contain less PNE, due to the fact that all the players
have to play one of their best response strategies to form a
PNE. Furthermore, RS never found a PNE on those game in-
stances, which highlights the huge combinatorial action space
on which Q-Nash performs comparatively well with respect
to the effectiveness.
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Figure 4: Variance of found PNE – Q-Nash on Road-Topology
games with different numbers of players.
Because of quantum annealing being a heuristic, one can
set the number of annealing attempts with the num repeats
parameter of QBSolv, to improve the accuracy. In Fig. 6 the
influence of this parameter is shown. We exemplary used a 25
player road game and ran Q-Nash 20 times per parameter set-
ting to show its impact on the effectiveness. As expected one
can see, that with increasing number of annealing attempts
the inter-quartile range and its median in regard to the num-
ber of PNE found, increase. Although an annealing process
takes only 20µs, it adds up with the num repeats parameter
and therefore leads to a trade-off between computational time
and accuracy.
The computational results are shown for circle structured
graphical games and can be viewed in Tab. 2. The used game
instances differ in the number of players (6-20 Player) and the
computing times are given in seconds for both, the BF and our
Q-Nash algorithm. As already mentioned in Sec. 5.2 we need
to use QBSolv to solve large problem instances and therefore
we have to consider the computational results of Q-Nash with
caution, as stated in Sec. 5.3.
Regarding the BF algorithm, the total time (1) is only given
Graphical Games (Circle)
6 Player 8 Player 10 Player 12 Player 14 Player 16 Player 18 Player 20 Player
BF (1) Total time [s] 6.235 428.344 107486.286 - - - - -
Q-Nash
(2) Total time [s] 85.393 125.828 457.906 424.701 273.283 228.609 276.593 248.547
(3) Find embedding (Classic) [s] 4.172 4.062 4.093 5.155 4.813 5.703 4.202 4.391
(4) Determining best responses (Classic) [s] 0.391 0.891 1.828 3.063 4.906 7.328 10.704 14.360
(5) QBSolv (Classic) [s] 79.862 120.012 448.834 412.869 260.285 212.849 258.395 226.775
(6) QA time (Quantum) [s] 0.968 0.863 3.151 3.614 3.279 2.729 3.292 3.021
Table 2: Computational times of the Q-Nash and Brute Force (BF) algorithms on various circle structured graphical games
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Figure 5: Variance of found PNE – Q-Nash on Circle-Topology
games with different numbers of players.
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Figure 6: The impact of num repeats parameter on a 25 player road
game.
for graphical games with maximal 10 players, since the com-
putational time is exponential with respect to the number of
players. For the 10 player game BF already took more than 1
day and 5 hours on an Intel Core i5-4590 CPU with 3.30GHz.
However, due to Q-Nash’s immense overhead time (embed-
ding, tabu search, latency, queuing time, etc.) the total time
(2) is outperformed by BF in relation to the 6 player game.
Nevertheless the pure Q-Nash computational time (determin-
ing best response strategies (4) & QA time (6)) is compara-
tively very small (1.359 sec).
In general, one can see that the quantum annealing time (6)
for these game instances is quite constant and the runtime of
the classical Q-Nash phase (4) is only polynomial, as stated
in Section 4.1.
With the embedding time (3) being constant, the only un-
predictable runtime component of Q-Nash is QBSolv classic
(5). This is due to the tabu search, which only terminates after
a specified number of iterations in which no improvement of
the previously found solutions could be made.
However, with increasing number of qubits and their con-
nectivity it might be possible to map larger game instances
directly to the hardware chip such that the hybrid solver QB-
Solv can be avoided. Thus, the total Q-Nash time would only
consist of the classical algorithm phase time (4), the embed-
ding time (3) and a fraction of the quantum annealing time
(6), since we do not have to split our problem instance into
subproblems anymore.
7 Conclusion
We proposed Q-Nash, to our knowledge the first algorithm
that finds PNE-GG using quantum annealing hardware.
Regarding the effectiveness of Q-Nash, we showed that for
small game instances (ranging from 6-10 players) the algo-
rithm was always able to find all PNE in differently structured
graphical games. Anyway we have to mention, that with in-
creasing number of players the variance w.r.t the number of
found PNE increased, too.
Due to the fact that quantum computing is still in its infancy
and recent hardware is limited in the number of qubits and
their connectivity, we had to fall back on a quantum-classical
hybrid solver, called QBSolv, which involves additional over-
head time. That makes it difficult to draw a fair comparison
of Q-Nash and classical state-of-the-art solution methods re-
garding the computational time. We therefore decomposed
the total time into its main components to show their impact.
According to the experimental results, the only unpredictable
time component is QBSolv’s classical tabu search along with
latency and job queuing times at D-Wave’s cloud computing
frontend. However with D-Wave announcing an immense rise
of the number of qubits and their connectivity on D-Wave’s
quantum processors in the next years4, it might be possible
to embed larger game instances directly onto the chip and
therefore omit hybrid solvers like QBSolv. Another possi-
bility is using Fujitsu’s Digital Annealing Unit (DAU) which
also takes a QUBO matrix as input. With DAU being able to
solve larger fully connected QUBO problems [Aramon et al.,
2019], a shorter total computation time could be achieved.
4https://www.dwavesys.com/sites/default/files/mwj dwave
qubits2018.pdf
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